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Abstract
Background: All health care systems face the need to find the resources to meet new demands such as a new,
cost-increasing health technology. In England and Wales, when a health technology is recommended by the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), the National Health Service (NHS) is mandated to provide
the funding to accommodate it within three months of publication of the recommendation. Identifying what, in
practice, is foregone when new cost-increasing technologies are introduced is important for understanding the
effects of health technology assessment (HTA) decisions on the NHS or any other health care system. Our objective
was to investigate how in practice local NHS commissioners in Wales accommodated financial “shocks” arising from
technology appraisals (TAs) issued by NICE and from other cost pressures.
Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with Finance Directors and Medical Directors from all seven
Local Health Boards (LHBs) in NHS Wales. These interviews covered prioritisation processes, as well as methods of
financing NICE TAs and other financial shocks at each LHB. We then undertook a systematic identification of
themes and topics from the information recorded. The study relates to the period October 2010 to March 2013.
Results: The financial impact of NICE TAs is generally anticipated and planned for in advance and the majority of
LHBs have contingency funds available to cope with these and other financial shocks within-period. Efficiency
savings (defined as reductions in costs with no assumed reductions in quality) were a source of funds for cost
pressures of all kinds. Service displacements were not linkable to particular NICE TAs and there appears to be a
general lack of explicit prioritisation activities. The Welsh Government has, on occasion, explicitly or implicitly acted
as the funder of last resort.
Conclusions: Services may be displaced as part of a response to the cumulative impact of all types of cost
pressures, including cost-increasing health technologies recommended by NICE, but such displacements were not
direct responses to the publication of individual NICE TAs. The additional cost pressure represented by a new NICE
TA is likely to be accommodated at least partly by greater efficiency and increased expenditure rather than
displacement of services.
Keywords: Opportunity cost, Priority setting, Cost-effectiveness, Health technology assessment, National Health
Service, All Wales Medicines Strategy Group, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
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Background
Set up in 1999, the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence (NICE) provides national guidance and
advice to improve health and social care. A key part of
NICE’s role is conducting technology appraisals (TAs),
where it makes recommendations on the use of new and
existing treatments by the National Health Service
(NHS) in England and Wales. The decision to recom-
mend a technology is determined by both clinical and
economic evidence, where cost-effectiveness is generally
measured as the additional cost per quality-adjusted life
year (QALY) gained, with some adjustments made to ac-
count for social value judgements such as the severity of
underlying illness, disadvantaged populations or end-of-
life treatment [1–3]. NHS commissioners of health care
for their local populations are mandated to provide the
necessary funding to meet such new recommendations
by three months from the publication of the TA.
In practice, NICE bases its recommendations on a
comparison of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
(ICERs) of new technologies against a cost-effectiveness
“threshold”. NICE has stated that its cost-effectiveness
threshold lies in the range of £20,000–30,000 per QALY
gained. As the ICER of a new technology increases above
£20,000, explicit consideration of factors other than
cost-effectiveness is required, and above £30,000 an in-
creasingly strong case is needed with respect to these
other considerations [2]. Dakin et al. [4] have shown that
NICE’s past recommendations, although driven largely
by the ICER, include many with ICERs well above
£30,000 per QALY, reflecting other criteria considered
by NICE.
The threshold range stated by NICE has been the sub-
ject of controversy. The House of Commons Select
Committee on Health concluded in its 2007–2008 inquiry
that “the affordability of NICE guidance and the range,
measured in cost-per-QALY, it uses to decide whether a
treatment is cost-effective is of serious concern. The
threshold it employs is not based on empirical research
and is not directly related to the NHS budget, nor is it at
the same level as that used by PCTs [Primary Care Trusts
– the territorial organisations responsible for purchasing
health care for their local populations in England] in pro-
viding treatments not assessed by NICE” [5].
There have been various attempts to estimate the
value of the cost per QALY threshold. One model, first
put forward by Culyer et al. [6], involves identifying the
threshold that lies between the least cost-effective tech-
nology currently provided and the most cost-effective
technology not yet available routinely in the NHS.
Appleby et al. [7] and Karlsberg Schaffer et al. [8] follow
this model and use a bottom-up approach to attempt to
estimate the threshold by identifying these marginal ser-
vices and their corresponding costs per QALY gained.
Claxton et al. [9] instead take a top-down approach to
estimating the threshold: they use aggregate data on
spending and outcomes by NHS PCTs across 23
Programme Budget Categories to estimate the average
relationship between money spent and QALYs gained
when comparing across PCTs.
Underpinning these attempts to estimate the cost per
QALY threshold, and the health technology assessment
(HTA) process itself, is an important assumption: that
the approval of new, cost-increasing services will displace
funds from existing health care services. If this assumption
holds, the opportunity cost of NICE’s recommendation
then depends on the ICER of the displaced service. The
assumption is explicit in NICE’s decision making: “a tech-
nology can be considered to be cost effective if its health
benefits are greater than the opportunity costs of pro-
grammes displaced to fund the new technology, in the
context of a fixed NHS budget” [2].
To our knowledge, there has been no research that in-
vestigates the validity of the “displacement assumption” in
the NHS. If it does not fully hold in practice, this has im-
portant implications for health policy and future research
concerning the cost-effectiveness threshold and the op-
portunity cost of spending decisions. In particular, this
paper discusses two other responses to cost-increasing
HTA recommendations:
1. If health care providers are not yet getting the most
from their resources, i.e. there is some so-called
“x-inefficiency” [10] in the way they produce health
care, then increased pressure of demand may be met
to some extent by increased technical efficiency
rather than by displacement of other health services.
2. If local health care organisations treat their budgets
as, in extremis, not absolutely fixed and/or have the
opportunity to turn to a funder of last resort, then
some increased demand pressure may lead to
increased expenditure, in which case the
opportunity cost might fall outside the health
budget. It is impossible for a local health
organisation to have spent all of its annual budget
to the last pound, and not a pound more, at
midnight on the last day of the financial year.
Thus every such organisation will have a non-zero
underspend or overspend every year. Its response
to increased pressure on its budget may in part
be to underspend less or overspend more. It may
even explicitly request increased funds from the
Government. In Wales the funder of last resort
for local health organisations is the Welsh
Government, which may find the funds either
from another part of the NHS in Wales or from
other services for which it has responsibility
(social services, education, etc.).
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This paper fits within a broad area of recent literature
from the UK and elsewhere that focuses on priority-
setting and rationing of health care services. For ex-
ample, Robinson et al. [11] is a qualitative research study
investigating local priority-setting and resource alloca-
tion activity across five English PCTs. The authors note
the “political complexity” involved in implementing the
redesign of services and the lack of resources available
to produce and understand cost-effectiveness evidence.
Other issues highlighted in the priority-setting literature
include the need for procedural justice and “fair”
decision-making processes, shortages of local quantita-
tive data to inform decision-making and the importance
of leadership in the context of making “tough decisions”.
The aim of the current paper is to identify how NHS
organisations, which might be considered to have fixed
budgets, reallocated resources in practice when respond-
ing to a legal requirement to fund new, cost increasing
technologies. Specifically, our objectives are to investi-
gate: (a) how local NHS commissioners accommodated
financial shocks arising from NICE TAs and from other
requirements; and (b) how prioritisation decisions were
made in the NHS by those budget holders.
Methods
Scope
Since October 2009, NHS Wales has been organised in
seven Local Health Boards (LHBs) that are each respon-
sible for commissioning and delivering all NHS health
care services within a geographical area. The degree of
organisational stability since 2009 made NHS Wales a
more practical subject of research than any part of
England, which was once again subject to a major reor-
ganisation in 2012–2013.
Our study takes as its focus how the LHBs in Wales
responded to the publication of cost-increasing NICE
recommendations. NICE’s TA recommendations consti-
tute mandates to the LHBs as they are required to have
the necessary funds available for recommended services
by three months from the date the recommendation is
published by NICE. We asked senior medical and fi-
nance managers how their LHBs had accommodated
NICE mandates arising between October 2010 and
March 2013, allowing one year for adjustments to the
NHS Wales reorganisation that produced the current
LHB structure. The time period to which these data re-
late coincides with an era of reductions in health bud-
gets for NHS Wales: over the period from 2010/11 to
2012/13 NHS spending per head of population fell by
1 % p.a. in cash terms in Wales [12].
Official documents
At the start of the project we undertook Google
searches, and searches of each LHB’s website specifically,
to obtain any public LHB documents mentioning how
any NICE mandate had been responded to. We found
no such documents, and none was subsequently identi-
fied by any of the interviewees.
Interview targets
We undertook a qualitative analysis based on semi-
structured telephone interviews. The same questions, in
the same order, were asked of all interviewees and the
questions were open-ended rather than closed. We
sought to avoid imposing assumptions on how or what
the respondents would answer and were careful to ask
neutral, non-leading questions. A copy of the interview
questions is attached in Additional file 1.
To recruit interviewees for the study, we attended and
presented our research objectives to All Wales meetings
of Medical Directors in June 2013 and of Finance Direc-
tors in July 2013. We then approached the Medical and
Finance Directors from each of the seven LHBs indi-
vidually by email and asked whether they would be will-
ing to participate in the study. Of the 14 Directors
approached, 10 agreed to be interviewed or nominated a
senior member of staff to be interviewed in their place.
Three declined to be interviewed and one did not re-
spond after two reminders. We interviewed at least one
representative from every LHB (see Table 1): five Med-
ical Directors and five Finance Directors. Interviews last
between 21 and 46 min.
Interview structure
The purpose of the research was summarised at the out-
set of each interview, and the interviewer explained that
no remarks would subsequently be attributed either to
individuals or to particular organisations. Permission to
audio record the interview was sought, and given in
every case. The purpose of the audio recording was to
enable the interviewer to confirm the accuracy of their
notes of the points made in the interview. To further en-
sure accuracy, these notes were then sent to the inter-
viewee for them to amend if necessary. The results
Table 1 Study interviewees









✘Individual was not interviewed
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presented in this paper are from the resulting agreed,
validated notes of the 10 interviews.
The interviews were divided into three sections, as
follows:
1. Planning and prioritisation
2. NICE Technology Appraisals
3. Other financial “shocks”.
In the first section of the interview, participants were
asked about procedures, policies and guidelines for pri-
oritisation at their LHB. This included information on
the general process by which the costs of NICE TA rec-
ommendations are absorbed and whether LHBs had
funds set aside especially for the implementation of
NICE guidance.
In the second section, we asked the interviewees
how in practice their LHBs had found the funds to
comply with the particular NICE TAs that had been
issued since October 2010. We requested information
on any TAs that had a particularly large financial im-
pact and how this impact was accommodated within
a fixed budget. We also asked interviewees to identify
any services which might have been displaced, in the
sense that they were discontinued, received less funding,
or the referral thresholds were significantly raised, in
response to the financial burden imposed by a NICE TA.
In the third section of the interview, we focussed on fi-
nancial shocks other than the required implementation
of NICE recommendations. We asked participants to ex-
plain how, in general, they accommodated shocks and to
identify any that were particularly problematic. We also
asked how savings were made within each Board and
whether this entailed displacement of services, delays in
planned increases, making efficiency savings or allocat-
ing contingency funds.
Analysis
Nine of the interviews were conducted by the same re-
searcher (SKS). Consistency in information recording
between those and the tenth interview (by JS) was en-
sured by the common questionnaire scripts being used
(Additional file 1), by the two researchers reading and
commenting on each other’s interview notes, and by the
process of confirming the notes with the interviewees
themselves.
When the 10 interviews were complete and the corre-
sponding sets of notes were available, SKS and JS inde-
pendently reviewed them and independently undertook
systematic (coded) identification of themes and topics
from the information recorded. The two researchers
then compared their respective analyses. Where the
researchers were initially unsure of their interpretations
of an interviewee’s response on a particular point a
consensus was reached by returning to the source ma-
terial together.
All interviewees were asked to highlight any key docu-
ments relevant to our questions. Where documents were
identified we either obtained these directly from LHB or
other organisations’ websites or they were provided by
the interviewee.
A Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Studies
(COREQ) 32-item checklist is available in Additional file 2.
Results
The results of the interviews are summarised in Table 2,
where themes and topics identified by the interviewers/
analysts are listed in the first column. LHBs are labelled
1–7 and in a random order to protect anonymity. At the
three LHBs where we obtained two interviews there
were no inconsistencies between the responses we re-
ceived from the separate respondents.
The remainder of the Results section discusses these
topics in turn, grouping them under the following two
main headings:
 Institutional frameworks for prioritisation
 Responding to NICE TAs and other financial shocks.
Institutional frameworks for prioritisation
Frameworks for prioritising interventions
The Medical Director from LHB 5 explained that the de-
velopment of prioritisation frameworks had been dis-
cussed at an All Wales level and that each Board was
expected to create its own Prioritisation Panel. However,
their development appeared to be at only the beginning
stages across most of Wales.
Interviewees from five of the seven LHBs (1, 3, 4, 6 & 7)
said that their LHB had no formal method for prioritising
the services provided. The Finance Director from LHB 6
explained that although their LHB has a panel that reviews
NICE guidance, they do not have a process that would be
“recognised as mechanistic or formulaic” for testing the
value for money of interventions and the panel does not
manage services other than those recently appraised by
NICE. The Finance Director from LHB 1 commented that
“the level of clarity … is not yet such that decision-makers
assess the marginal benefit of various procedures versus
those which NICE is recommending”.
The Medical Director from LHB 1 explained that in the
event of numerous groups of clinicians requesting that
various additional treatments are funded, each group
would produce a business case which would be required to
map back to priorities outlined by the Welsh Government.
One LHB has created a Prioritisation Panel to examine
potential service developments and disinvestment op-
portunities (LHB 5). At this LHB, the criteria used by
the panel to prioritise service developments include:
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clinical effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and equity and
equality impact. The Medical Director said that cost-
effectiveness can be difficult to assess, given that formal
health economic evidence is often missing. Examples of
decisions the panel has made so far include determining
the referral thresholds for cataract surgery and using
lifestyle interventions to maximise the potential from
hip and knee operations.
At this same Board, an exercise was undertaken to
identify potential areas for disinvestment by Clinical
Programme Group (CPG). The resulting document lists
procedures currently on the NICE “do not do” list as
well as the Cochrane Quality and Productivity Topics,
where the latter “highlight potential disinvestment op-
portunities that can be used by the NHS to meet its …
targets, and include calculations of potential cost savings
if implemented.”
At LHB 2, a Prioritisation Board and a Clinical Effect-
iveness Board have been developed. At the time of inter-
view, the Clinical Effectiveness Board had heard a
number of cases but the Prioritisation Board had, we
were told, been little referred to. An explanation given
by the Finance Director for the limited use of the Priori-
tisation Board is that the LHB “very rarely does proactive
investment” – most of their investments are obligatory,
e.g. staff pay-awards. They also have an Equalities Im-
pact Assessment (EQIA) system in place which is used
to predict the impact of planned disinvestments such as
reductions in staff and bed numbers. For example, the
LHB carried out an EQIA of plans to close their Inpatient
Mother and Baby Unit – the net impact was found to be
positive due to the reinvestment of the funds. In assessing
potential disinvestments, cost-effectiveness evidence is
used but this not in terms of QALYs.
Another interviewee (Finance Director) said that their
LHB (4) was likely to develop a formal prioritisation
framework in the coming years.
Thus, overall, no respondent identified their LHB as
yet using an explicitly documented framework of criteria
for prioritising expenditure decisions, such as when re-
quired to find funds for a new NICE mandate.
“Interventions not normally undertaken”
We were alerted by two interviewees to an All Wales pol-
icy document called “Making Decisions on Individual
Patient Funding Requests (IPFR)” [13]. Its purpose was to
improve transparency around the availability of treatments
provided by the NHS. In particular, the document outlined
the policy in NHS Wales for requests which fall outside
the range of services routinely provided by LHBs and the
Welsh Health Specialised Services Committee (WHSSC).
As is explained on p.3 of the document, such requests
will normally be within one of the three following
categories:
Table 2 Summary of results
Local Health Board
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Institutional frameworks for prioritisation
Framework for prioritising interventions ✘ ✓ ✘ ✘ ✓ ✘ ✘
Interventions Not Normally Undertaken ✓ ✓a ✓ ∙ ✓ ✓a ✓a
Responding to NICE TAs
Horizon scanning ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✘
NICE contingency fund ✓ ✓ ✘ ✘ ✓ ✓ ✓
Efficiency savings ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Displacements linked to individual NICE TAs ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘
Other examples of displacement by LHB ✘ ✓ ✘ ✘ ✓ ✘ ✘
Phasing in of NICE guidance ✓ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ✓ ✓
Savings first sought in same clinical programme ✘ ✘ ✘ ✘ ✓ ✘ ✓
Savings first sought in medicines budget ✘ ✓ ✘ ✓ ✘ ✘ ✘
Extra funds sought/received from Welsh Govt. ∙ ∙ ∙ ✓ ∙ ∙ ✘
Responding to other financial shocks
Contingency fund for other shocks ✘ ✓ ✘ ✘ ✓ ✓ ∙
Extra funds requested/received from govt. ✓ ∙ ✓ ∙ ✓ ∙ ✘
aNot referred to in interviews but found online by authors
✓Topic was mentioned by either one or two interviewees from that LHB
∙ Topic was not referred to specifically
✘Interviewee confirmed that the practice did not occur in their LHB
LHBs are labelled 1–7 and in a random order to protect anonymity
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 A treatment that is either new, novel, developing or
unproven and is not within the LHB’s routine
schedule of services and treatments
 A treatment that is provided by the LHB in certain
clinical circumstances but is not eligible in accordance
with the clinical policy criteria for that treatment
 A rare or specialist condition that falls within the
service remit of the WHSSC but is not eligible in
accordance with the clinical policy criteria for
treatment.
The document provides a guide for LHBs to dealing
with IPFRs, where the core principle is that the requests
must demonstrate “exceptionality”. There was no men-
tion of an equivalent guide to non-exceptional expend-
iture decision-making.
As detailed in the All Wales policy on IPFR, all LHBs
were required to compile a list of Interventions Not
Normally Undertaken (INNU). Three LHBs (1, 3 & 5) re-
ferred to it during the interviews and INNU lists for three
other LHBs were found in subsequent Google searching.
The reasons for an LHB not normally providing a service
may be one of the following three (as described in the All
Wales IPFR document):
 There is currently insufficient evidence of clinical
and/or cost effectiveness
 The intervention has not been reviewed by NICE or
the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group
 The intervention is considered to be of relatively low
priority for NHS resources.
Having examined all available INNU policies (six), it
is clear that the level of detail and the use of evidence
vary from Board to Board. In the INNU document
for one LHB, economic considerations are addressed
specifically:
“The [LHB] can no longer consider investing in any
new developments unless they are clearly more
effective, improve patient experience and health
outcomes, and are at least equal in value for money to
existing services or interventions. Choosing one
intervention or service means that the [LHB] cannot
provide another – that is, there are opportunity costs
to everything that [the LHB] does.”
Many of the interventions listed are common across
boards. Some examples of interventions not normally





 Varicose vein treatment.
Responding to NICE TAs and other financial shocks
Horizon scanning and contingency funds
The way in which LHBs manage the implementation of
NICE TAs varies from Board to Board. All but one LHB
(LHB 7) mentioned “horizon scanning”: a process that
determines which medicines or other technologies are
likely to be recommended in the coming financial year
and the potential impact this will have on their finances.
In five of the seven LHBs (LHBs 1, 2, 5, 6, & 7) this is
linked to the creation of a NICE contingency fund, set
aside specifically to accommodate the estimated financial
burden expected from new NICE mandates during the
coming year. Some of the LHBs also mentioned contin-
gency funds for other specific areas of financial uncer-
tainty (as distinct from a single common contingency for
all financial shocks).
The horizon scanning process is often done “in house”
by LHBs’ pharmacy/medicines departments but it builds
on national level horizon scanning by NHS Wales phar-
macists who provide each LHB with their estimate of
the local impact, given the LHB’s population size and
characteristics. Depending on the LHB, either it decides
to set exactly that amount aside (2/7 LHBs), or it instead
uses the centrally provided estimate as merely a guide
and it may perform its own horizon scanning exercise
(5/7 LHBs).
When asked specifically how their LHB dealt with
NICE TAs that were unexpected and so could not have
been planned for during the horizon scanning process,
we received varied responses. Interviewees from three
LHBs (1, 2 & 5) were adamant that their LHB planning
process had ensured that their Boards had not been
caught out by NICE mandates in the period since
October 2010. Both interviewees from LHB 1 stated
that their LHB’s contingency fund had always proved
to be larger than was necessary. The Finance Director
from LHB 2 said that NICE timescales tend to “slip”
leading the LHBs to overestimate the in-year impacts
of NICE TAs.
Despite the level of planning that takes place, we
were told of instances where NICE TAs had been
problematic for LHBs to accommodate. The following
TAs were mentioned by interviewees when asked for
any examples that had had a notable local financial
burden:
 Rivaroxaban (2012) – a new anticoagulant (3)
 Boceprevir and telaprevir (2012) – new hepatitis C
protease inhibitors (3)
 Aflibercept (2013) – drug for age-related macular
degeneration (AMD) (3)
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 Golimumab (2012) – monoclonal antibody therapy
for rheumatoid arthritis (2)
 Omalizumab (2013) – a recently reviewed asthma
drug (1).
The year of recommendation and the number of LHBs
mentioning the TA are in brackets.
Efficiency savings
The most common response to the question of how
cost-increasing NICE TAs are accommodated involved
the LHB making efficiency savings, that is reductions in
costs which are intended not to lead to reductions in
benefits. The demands of NICE TAs are in all LHBs
considered as one of a number of “cost pressures” that
the Board must deal with in-year. Other cost pressures
include increased demand for services, staff pay awards
and energy price increases.
From LHB 2, we were able to identify some other ex-
amples of financial shocks. These included problems
with cardiac surgery that forced them to outsource a
number of patients to England and the previous year’s
“bad winter”, which caused them to cancel operations
and therefore incur extra costs to meet waiting time tar-
gets. The interviewee also mentioned that their LHB had
been expecting to benefit from savings from the costs of
generic (“Category M”) medicines but these were not
realised because the procurement arrangements were
changed. In total, this LHB faced unexpected cost pres-
sures in-year equivalent to approximately 1 % of its total
annual budget.
We were told by all that it was the totality of these
cost pressures which force the LHBs to seek efficiencies
or other savings. The Finance Director from LHB 1 ex-
plained that potential savings are broken down into dif-
ferent categories such as: workforce productivity, service
redesign, non-pay operating expenditure (general sup-
plies and services), management and procurement.
More specifically, the Finance Director from LHB 6
named reducing staffing costs and bed numbers and
treating patients as day cases rather than inpatients
(where appropriate) as specific means of making savings.
With regards to reducing staffing costs, the Finance Dir-
ector from LHB 4 said that the focus was on control of
variable pay (pay for agency staff and overtime), as op-
posed to that of core staff. The same interviewee also
described efficiency savings in the LHB’s use of medi-
cines, including switching from branded to generic drugs
and not issuing prescriptions for medicines that can be
bought over the counter.
It should be noted that a distinction can be drawn be-
tween pure efficiency savings (reductions in x-inefficiency
or “slack”), such as those resulting from substitution to
generic drugs, which can reasonably be assumed to have
no impact on health outcomes, and efficiency savings
where the impact on health is more complex. For ex-
ample, when the Finance Director from LHB 4 was asked
whether staffing cuts were expected to affect the quality of
service provision, they explained that staff safety levels on
wards were always maintained but there could be longer
waiting lists (for elective surgery, for instance) as an unin-
tended consequence of achieving savings. This is an ex-
ample of where what is described as an efficiency may
nonetheless have an opportunity cost in terms of forgone
benefits to patients.
The Finance Director from LHB 2 explained that areas
in which efficiency savings can be made are identified
using a benchmarking process. This involves comparing
statistics across a range of metrics (average length of
stay, day case rates, waiting times, etc.) between their
own LHB and other Welsh LHBs, as well as NHS pro-
viders across England.
Another participant, the Finance Director from LHB 1,
provided an interesting insight into the importance of ef-
ficiency savings as opposed to service displacements
when responding to cost pressures of any kind. They ex-
plained that the tendency to make efficiency savings ra-
ther than to reduce the provision of services on the basis
of cost-effectiveness is the result of the fact that the
commissioning function in NHS Wales has “waned with
the internal market” (which was abolished in 2009). In
other words, because the purchaser-provider split that
previously existed in Wales no longer exists, decision
makers are now less focussed on which services to con-
tinue or discontinue. The interviewee added that “look-
ing at what we provide as opposed to the efficiency of
what we provide is less focussed [in Wales]”.
We were told on numerous occasions during the inter-
views that making efficiency savings was particularly im-
portant given that NHS Wales has been operating in a
“flat cash” environment in recent years, resulting in a
real terms reduction in funding after accounting for in-
put price inflation. This is a challenging environment in
which to accommodate cost pressures: one interviewee
described how their LHB had to be “continuously im-
proving efficiency throughout the organisation” to cope
(LHB 2, Medical Director). Another explained that all
Welsh LHBs were forecasting a deficit against budget for
the current financial year (2013/14) (LHB 1, Finance
Director).
Displacement of health services
We asked interviewees directly whether their LHBs had
since October 2010 been forced to disinvest from health
improving services in order to meet the funding de-
mands imposed by a newly published NICE TA. In all
cases, the interviewees could recall no examples where
this type of direct displacement had taken place. The
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Medical Director from LHB 7 explained that he could
not think of a single occasion where an “either, or” deci-
sion had to be made. In addition, two Medical Directors
highlighted the absence of guidance on how displace-
ment could be achieved (LHBs 5 & 7).
A common theme throughout the interviews was that
a Board may have to make planned reductions in ser-
vices, though not necessarily to health-improving ser-
vices, but that it would not be possible to link such
displacement to any one cost pressure, let alone any spe-
cific appraisal. A specific example given of a planned
cost saving was the cancelling of an outreach clinic at a
local venue to save costs, meaning that patients would
have to travel further to obtain the service at a hospital
(LHB 5, Medical Director).
One interviewee explained that although their LHB
had not made disinvestments in response to the financial
burden of specific NICE TAs, the cumulative cost of
TAs through the financial year had led them to delay de-
sired investments (LHB 2, Finance Director). The
principle of delaying a desired investment is similar to
that of making an explicit disinvestment in that both can
be expected to have a detrimental effect on population
health relative to their respective counterfactuals. It is
important to note, however, that delaying investment in
new or expanded services may be regarded as more ac-
ceptable in terms of public/political perception relative
to cutting existing services.
The Finance Director from LHB 2 gave the example of
fidaxomicin, an antibiotic for the management of Clos-
tridium difficile that they would like to prescribe because
it has the potential to reduce instances of health care ac-
quired infections, but which they do not offer because
they do not have the funds. The interviewee stated that
there was a “strong link” between the cumulative pres-
sure of NICE TAs and the decision not to invest in the
antibiotic but that it was not the only factor, and this
displacement could not be linked to any individual TA.
Other examples of delayed investments that can be
linked to the total financial burden imposed by NICE
TAs include the replacement of medical equipment and
the modernisation of the LHB’s IT/prescribing system.
At LHB 7, the Medical Director explained that, al-
though they could not think of a specific example,
implementing NICE TAs would be likely to displace
some “normal activity”, perhaps resulting in increased
waiting times for some patients.
Phasing in of NICE guidance
Respondents at three of the seven LHBs offered an add-
itional type of response to the question of how LHBs ac-
commodate unexpected NICE TAs, namely by delaying
their response, at least in part, beyond the date three
months from the publication of the NICE TA (LHBs 1, 2
& 7). Delaying the response to a new NICE mandate
correspondingly delays the point at which responding to
the mandate generates opportunity costs. It was pointed
out that some NICE mandates require prior build-up of
infrastructure – appropriately trained staff, perhaps add-
itional diagnostic services, which are not initially avail-
able in sufficient quantities – meaning that the rate of
implementation of the mandate is inevitably less than
immediate and is to a degree at the discretion of the
LHB concerning the speed of build-up.
For example, the approval of boceprevir and telaprevir
(hepatitis C protease inhibitors) was very costly to imple-
ment in parts of Wales due to the high number of patients
eligible for treatment. The Medical Director from LHB 7
explained that the infrastructure simply did not exist to
administer the drugs to every eligible patient in their area
of responsibility from day one. Instead, they started treat-
ing the neediest patients first and created a plan so that all
eligible patients would be treated within 6–9 months. An-
other interviewee (LHB 1, Finance Director) explained
that because all patients must be assessed before they can
receive the hepatitis C drugs, their LHB began running
the assessment clinic within the three month window but
did not start treating patients until later.
In a similar manner, the Finance Director from LHB 6
said that had they implemented the guidance for rivaroxa-
ban to its fullest extent as soon as it was published, this
would have had a “crippling” effect on the LHB’s finances.
Instead it was introduced in a “more constrained” manner.
Where the opportunity cost arises
Our interviews revealed different approaches in different
LHBs to where funds would be sought in response to the
need to deliver a new NICE mandate. Figure 1 illustrates
schematically the range of possibilities. An initial response
might be to look for an offsetting saving in the same clinical
programme (cancer, mental health, etc.) to which the new
NICE TA applies (shown as a shaded column of the matrix
in the centre of Fig. 1). Elsewhere the first target might be
the LHB’s medicines bill – as opposed to any other type of
expenditure such as staff costs (a shaded row of the matrix
in the centre of Fig. 1). Our interviews revealed two LHBs
that look first for offsetting savings within the same clinical
programme area (LHBs 5 & 7), and two that look first
within the LHB’s medicines budget (LHBs 2 & 4).
An LHB might not take such a “silo” view of its expen-
ditures and instead look across the whole of its budget
for possible offsets to the new cost pressure. Three of
the LHBs in Wales appear from our interviews to take
this approach at the outset (LHBs 1, 3 & 6).
If the LHB failed to find the funds itself it might either
increase its spending by reducing a planned underspend
or taking the risk of a greater overspend of its budget –
bearing in mind that the cost of an individual NICE TA is
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typically considerably less than 1 % of an LHB’s total an-
nual budget – or it might actively seek additional funding
from the Welsh Government. In that case the opportunity
cost might either fall on some part of the NHS outside the
LHB receiving the additional funds, or on a non-health
care part of the Welsh Government’s expenditure.
Some interviewees highlighted occasions where their
LHB had been hit by a financial “shock” (from a NICE
TA or elsewhere) and had been able to request extra
funds from the Welsh Government to accommodate it.
For example, the Medical Director from LHB 5 ex-
plained that when the guidance was issued for an Age-
Related Macular Degeneration (AMD) drug, it amounted
to a “substantial additionality that was very difficult to
absorb”. As the Welsh Government considered the drug
an “irrefutably beneficial technology”, they helped the
LHB by paying a contribution towards infrastructure
costs and the unit costs of the drug. It was argued that
doing so would create long-term savings in social care.
Disinvesting in other areas of ophthalmology such as
cataract surgery was not seen as an option because there
was high demand for these procedures as well.
Occasions other than new NICE TAs where LHBs have
requested extra funds from the Welsh Government to
cover unexpected costs include an emergency refurbish-
ment of a hospital due to the use of asbestos (LHB 5) and
meeting increased vaccination costs in response to a recent
measles epidemic (LHB 1). In general, situations where the
Welsh Government might be expected to absorb cost pres-
sures are those which pose a national public health risk.
In addition, one interviewee explained that their LHB
has typically overspent on its total budget in recent
years, and anticipated this at the start of each financial
year (LHB 3, Finance Director). The amount overspent
each year has been funded by the Welsh Government
from other NHS Wales funds: either requiring repay-
ment the following year or writing off the amount.
Discussion
The cost per QALY threshold range applied by NICE,
the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) and the All
Wales Medicines Strategy Group (AWMSG) is £20,000–
£30,000 per QALY gained, implying that when a technol-
ogy is appraised, it is more likely to be approved if its
cost per QALY is at or below this level [2, 14, 15]. These
recommendations are based on the assumption that the
objective of the NHS is to maximise health gain, which
in practice NICE measures in terms of QALYs, with
some adjustment of the £/QALY threshold to account
for social value judgements [3].
LHBs’ budgets are assumed to be fixed and fully de-
ployed, in the sense that available budgets are fully allo-
cated to health care and are exhausted at the end of
each time period. In addition, health care providers are
assumed not to be x-inefficient, so that newly approved
technologies will displace services currently in operation
rather than being able to be funded from efficiency im-
provements. Our research indicates that all of these as-
sumptions are questionable.
Maximising health gain
We found that none of the LHBs in Wales currently
makes routine use of an explicit framework for prioritis-
ing expenditure decisions. A fortiori there seems to be
Fig. 1 Where opportunity costs might arise. Figure 1 illustrates schematically the range of possibilities for where the opportunity cost of new TAs
may lie. Offsetting savings may be found in a particular clinical programme (shown as columns) or in another type of expenditure such as the
LHB’s medicines bill or staff costs (shown as rows). The yellow/green shading in Fig. 1 illustrates the example of an LHB finding offsetting savings
in the medicines budget of Clinical Programme 2
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no explicit decision making framework in use aimed at
maximising health gain, measured by QALYs or in any
other way, or any combination of that with other
objectives.
Expenditure decisions in Wales are clearly strongly af-
fected by the range of health services currently provided,
and by a desire not to reduce any existing services if at
all possible, despite real-term reductions in budgets.
Planning
For the most part, it appears that, with the aid of hori-
zon scanning at both a local and national level, LHBs in
Wales successfully anticipate the financial scale of NICE
TAs to be published over the coming financial year.
Contingency funds are created and have, on most occa-
sions, proved adequate in the period under study (2010–
2013). In the HTA process, it is assumed that spending
in one area (as follows from the recommendation of a
new technology) necessarily involves shifting resources
away from another area. However, if the other area is a
contingency fund, this makes the identification of the
opportunity cost dependent on a different stage of
decision-making: the prioritisation of expenditures at the
planning stage when the contingency fund is set. Never-
theless, if the creation of a contingency fund is achieved
by not spending on health services, then its opportunity
cost may be counted in terms of patient gains forgone.
The successful use of contingency funds has meant
that our search for evidence of services displaced by
medicines and other technologies newly mandated by
NICE as a short-term response to an in-year financial
pressure has yielded no examples of displacement that
can be directly linked to individual NICE TAs. This im-
plies that the strategy pursued by Karlsberg Schaffer et
al. [8] in their recent study of the NHS Scotland is the
more fruitful one in terms of identifying what services
may be displaced at the margin. That study looked a
Scottish Health Boards’ plans: what they planned to in-
vest in at the margin, what they planned to delay imple-
menting and what, in a small number of cases, they
planned to disinvest from. The result was a list of ser-
vices around the margin – but demonstrating a very
wide range of costs per QALY.
Efficiency
In most activities there is scope to improve efficiency
and the language of NHS Directors focuses heavily on
doing so. The interviewee from LHB 2 encapsulated
this as “continuously making efficiency savings”. The
assumption of economic models that providers pro-
duce services at any given volume and quality at
minimum cost is a crude approximation (albeit one
which has the merit of making the mathematics of
such models much more tractable).
Our interviews revealed that when demand pressures
increase – as a result of NICE mandating a new technol-
ogy or for any other reason – but the budget available to
meet them does not, an important part of the response
is to try to squeeze out greater efficiency from providers.
In the short term this may mean pay freezes or other
cost-cutting, and in the medium term it may mean
changing the ways in which services are provided. For
example, the approval of an existing drug for a new pa-
tient group may result in increased demand for nurses’
time but instead of the LHB reallocating resources to-
wards that clinical area, the existing nurses may simply
be worked harder. The displaced “object” in this example
could be considered to be “nurses’ spare time”, the op-
portunity cost of which is very difficult to quantify.
Efficiency improvements are a continuing and import-
ant source of funds to meet additional cost pressures of
all kinds, including the cumulative impact of NICE TAs.
This finding is consistent with the priority-setting litera-
ture from elsewhere in the UK: for example, there is evi-
dence that in the NHS in England disinvestment is
“distinctly counter-cultural” and that NHS providers are
not familiar with “stopping doing things” [10].
If efficiency improvements would have been made to
the same extent even in the absence of the financial
shock, e.g. from a new cost-increasing NICE mandate,
then using them to release funds to pay for that mandate
implies that they are not being used to provide other
health services, and so the opportunity cost may be
thought of in terms of health gains forgone by others.
However, to the extent that it is only the pressure for in-
creased spending that stimulates the increased efficiency,
which would not have occurred in the absence of that fi-
nancial pressure, then there is no implied displacement
of health services by the new NICE mandate and hence
no foregone health gains elsewhere.
Mutable budgets
Thus far, we have discussed the evidence that, in prac-
tice, a LHB’s objective function (i.e. a quantitative sum-
mary of its goals) may be undefined or contain more
elements than QALYs alone and may not necessarily be
maximised. An additional assumption implicit in the
economic model underlying NICE’s TA process concerns
the constraint in the optimisation problem: it is assumed
that LHB budgets are “hard” in the sense that they are
strictly enforced by central government; that they are
fixed and unbreakable.
We have found that LHBs had some ability to increase
their spending when faced with increased cost pressures,
despite a legal duty to break even at the end of each fi-
nancial year. This may be achieved by underspending
less or overspending more against budget, given that
outturn spend is unavoidably not identical to budget
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given the uncertainties in health care demand and costs.
Or it may be achieved by explicitly requesting and
obtaining additional funds from the Welsh Government.
This is possible because the Government has the flexibil-
ity to increase its NHS spending at the expense of other
programmes out of its block allocation from HM Treasury
for devolved services. Thus the budget constraints facing
LHBs (and indeed any other NHS and many non-NHS
public bodies) may in fact be “soft” to some degree.
The possibility of a central government “hand-out” or
“bail-out” has consequences for the incentives of NHS
decision makers: the Welsh Government is acting as the
“lender of last resort”. Kornai [16] provides a discussion
of the efficiency losses that may result from the exist-
ence of soft budget constraints, focussing on the theory
of the firm. In a specific application to health care, Shen
and Eggleston [17] report evidence that the “softness” of
budget constraints can affect quality improvement
innovation and cost control in hospitals.
If NHS budgets in future years are assumed to be un-
affected by NHS expenditure this year, then the respite
for LHBs from increasing spending this year will be
short-lived and they will have to plan to displace services
or reduce x-inefficiency further next year rather than
have access to increased funds from the Government.
But if it is assumed that NHS spending in future years is
determined in part by NHS expenditures in past years,
then if LHBs increase their spending in response to a
new NICE mandate or other increase in demand, the op-
portunity cost of that may lie outside the NHS and could
be in any government sector. In that case, the opportun-
ity cost is no longer in terms of forgone health gain.
Policy implications
It is clear from our findings that the methods for decid-
ing on investments in health care technologies in the
NHS in Wales (NICE TAs) and those for accommodat-
ing those investments at the LHB level differ. The conse-
quences of that difference for the overall health of
patients in Wales are unknown. The apparent absence of
a prioritisation framework for LHBs suggests an avenue
worth considering would be to develop one. It may also
be worthwhile to consider the implications for NICE’s
approach of the criteria LHBs might wish to apply.
Avenues for future research
An important question that emerges from our study is
how to define the NHS’s objectives in a way that fits
with the processes and decisions we observe in practice.
One avenue to explore is the concept of “satisficing”:
where individuals or organisations attempt to achieve at
least some minimum level of a particular objective or
group of objectives, but do not necessarily maximise any
one, or any particular combination of them [18]. For
example, the objective of an LHB could be to ensure
that health (measured in QALYs or otherwise), waiting
times and staff satisfaction each do not fall below (or
above, in the case of waiting times) certain levels, but
not the levels that maximise health. Further work could
explore this, perhaps by combining quantitative analysis
of time series data on a number of indicators of interest
to LHBs with qualitative analysis such as interviews
similar to those in the current study.
Another important direction that may be explored is
the extent to which budget constraints are in practice
treated as binding and the theoretical and practical im-
plications of soft budget constraints. This behaviour is
not restricted to Wales: across the UK health system we
observe some health localities overspending their sup-
posedly fixed budgets and others underspending by non-
negligible amounts. Other parts of the UK public sector
that are also subject to supposedly fixed budgets demon-
strate similar flexibility.
Limitations of the study
The material for our qualitative analysis was obtained
via telephone interviews with senior managers of the
seven LHBs in Wales. LHB Medical Directors and Fi-
nance Directors can be expected to have a clear but high
level view of expenditure prioritisation and how such de-
cisions are made. Inevitably they will be unaware of all
the other decisions being made at lower levels within
LHBs. We also cannot be certain that the information
we received is representative of all decision makers in
NHS Wales, including other Board members such as the
Directors of Public Health and the Directors of Nursing,
and All-Wales level decision makers such as those at
Public Health Wales.
As with all interviews, there exists the possibility of re-
call bias by the respondents, either inadvertently or
through caution. The guarantee of individual and organ-
isation anonymity was intended to help encourage open
and full responses to our questions, but our total sample
was relatively small. The October 2010 to March 2013
time period we asked about was a compromise between
being recent and hence reasonably fresh in respondents’
minds, but going far enough back to encapsulate a sub-
stantial number of cost-increasing NICE mandates.
Our method of questioning is not the only one that
could have been used. For example, we might have pre-
sented interviewees with a hypothetical scenario, or a
series of such scenarios, and asked them what their ac-
tions would have been, rather than asking them what ac-
tually happened in the past. However, our approach has
the major advantage of grounding the responses directly
in the respondents’ experiences: these were financial
pressures that they and their colleagues had really faced
and had actually dealt with. Thus the responses can be
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expected to reveal how much displacement took place
and where, and hence where the opportunity cost would
have arisen.
Our study was limited to Wales, for reasons of practi-
cality (limited budget and timescale) and because Wales
represented a part of the NHS that had, unlike England,
not been the subject of disruptive organisational reforms
in the last three years. We would expect that our find-
ings should be of some relevance also to the NHS in
England, Northern Ireland and Scotland. Funding levels
differ across the four countries of the UK, as do the spe-
cific health care needs of their respective populations
but at a broad level both funding and need may be rea-
sonably assumed to be similar. The NHS in England has
separate bodies for commissioning and providing health
care, whereas in Wales and the rest of the UK both of
these activities take place within the same overall organi-
sations (LHBs in Wales). We cannot tell if this would
lead local NHS commissioning bodies in England to re-
spond to NICE mandates in systematically different ways
from how LHBs in Wales do, but we have no reason to
expect systematic differences.
Conclusions
The principal aim of this research was to analyse what
happened in practice when LHBs in Wales were re-
quired to fund cost-increasing health technologies as a
result of NICE TAs. We searched for public domain
documentation and interviewed 10 of the 14 Medical
and Finance Directors of LHBs (or their nominees).
We found that the majority of NICE recommendations
were anticipated and planned for by LHBs using horizon
scanning. This process was often used to create contin-
gency funds that had hitherto usually proved to be ad-
equately sized to deal with the financial pressures that
arose within a financial year. Therefore, the opportunity
cost of accommodating NICE TAs is to a large extent
determined at the LHB’s budget-setting stage, at the
point where the size of the contingency fund is decided.
This means that planned changes are important as a
source of information about the opportunity cost of
marginal expenditures in the NHS.
Services may have been displaced as part of a response
(generally a planned response) to the cumulative impact
of all types of cost pressures, but displacements were
not linkable to individual NICE mandates that were pub-
lished. To the extent that services were displaced to
make funds available for new cost-increasing health
technologies, then the opportunity cost may be esti-
mated in terms of patient benefits, principally health
gain, forgone.
When it was necessary to find additional funds to ac-
commodate new NICE TAs and other cost pressures,
this was generally achieved at least partly by improving
efficiency. To the extent that these efficiency improve-
ments would not have been sought in the absence of
the increase in pressure on finances, and to the ex-
tent that the efficiencies were genuine reductions in
x-inefficiency, meaning that the same quantity and
quality of existing health care services is provided as
before but at lower cost, then there are no forgone
patient health gains. In order to find an offsetting
saving, some LHBs looked within the same clinical
programme as the NICE TA, while others looked
within LHB “silos” such as the medicines budget.
A third type of response to a financial shock was sim-
ply to increase spending: by underspending the LHB
budget by less, by overspending it more, or on occasion
by explicitly requesting increased funds from the
Government.
Overall we conclude that the opportunity cost of new,
cost-increasing NICE mandates is not wholly felt in
terms of displacement of other NHS services, but at
least in part is reflected in increased efforts by health
care providers that result in greater efficiency. On occa-
sion there is increased NHS expenditure, which implies
that part of the opportunity cost may fall outside the
NHS. We hope that our findings can be used to
strengthen the design of future research into the oppor-
tunity costs of introducing cost-increasing health care
technologies.
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